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A State without Nationals:
The Nationality Issue in Japan’s Making of Manchukuo
Introduction1
In September of 1931, troops of the Kwantung Army in Northeast China occupied
the cities and towns along the South Manchuria Railway (SMR); this was later known as
the Mukden Incident or the Manchurian Incident. Faced with Japan‟s invasion, both the
local warlord, Zhang Xueliang, and the head of the Nanjing government, Chiang Kaishek, sidestepped military confrontation and attempted a diplomatic solution by
appealing to the League of Nations under the provisions of the Covenant so as to restrain
Japan‟s military ambitions in the region. Unfortunately, however, this conciliatory
attitude did not succeed in diffusing the tension; instead, it resulted in a political vacuum
with no competing power to respond to Japan‟s presence in the area. The most immediate
and direct outcome was Japan‟s establishment in the following year of Manchukuo, a
purportedly independent state under the control of the Kwantung Army.
Notwithstanding the historical significance that the establishment of Manchukuo
had contributed to changing the course of Asian and even world history, Manchukuo as
an independent state remains a controversial issue in modern East Asian history. In
Chinese historiography, Manchukuo was often referred to as “Wei Manzhouguo”
Manchukuo, a state without authenticity, and the government as “Kuilei Zhengquan,” a
puppet regime. Postwar Japanese historiography, on the other hand, was filled with
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This thesis adopts Roman alphabet to transcribe Japanese and Pinyin system to transcribe Chinese
character to English. Except for people‟s name and geographic name, words or phrases of Japanese or
Chinese origins are italicized. Names of people, geographic place, organizations are addressed in the
language to which they belong. Exceptions like “Kwantung Army” and “Chiang Kai-shek” are made to
maintain consistency with other documents and past scholarship.
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nostalgia for the ideals held by the past generation in making a utopian state. Many
political figures with strong connections to Manchukuo returned to the political circuit
after the cancellation of the occupation purge campaign by the Supreme Commander of
the Allied Powers (better known as the GHQ) in the 1950s. Kishi Nobusuke, who worked
as deputy director of the Management and Coordination Agency of Manchukuo, became
the 56th and 57th Prime Minister of Japan from 1957 to 1960. In his memoir, he states that
Manchukuo was “a truly unique modern state formation”.2 His former colleague,
Hoshino Naoki wrote a book titled An unrealized dream: The unofficial history of
Manchukuo in 1963 in which he expresses his regrets on the short life of the ideal state,
Manchukuo.3 Yamaguchi Jûji, a former active member of the Manchukuo Youth League,
published The founding of Manchukuo: An official history of Mukden Incident in 1975 to
justify the motivation of Japan‟s occupation of Manchuria.4 Their works shared a
common perspective that views Manchukuo as an effort to build an ideal state which
failed due to the pressures of war.
However, such insider-written books became more and more marginalized after
the 1980s and are even out-of-print recently. It seems that, since the 1990s, Japanese
scholars began to reconsider the nature of Manchukuo via a more balanced perspective.
An example of this is Yamamuro Shinichi‟s Chimera: A portrait of Manchukuo,5 which
stands out among the many academic attempts by filling the gap between the “puppet
2

Yamamuro Shinichi, Manchuria under Japanese Dominion, trans. Joshua A. Fogel (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 4.
3
Hoshino Naoki, Mihatenu yume: Manshûkoku gaishi (An unrealized dream: The unofficial history of
Manchukuo), (Tokyo: Daiyamondo sha, 1963).
4
Yamaguchi Jûji, Manshû kenkoku: Manshûjihen seishi (The founding of Manchukuo: An official history
of Mukden Incident), (Tokyo: Gyoseitsushin sha, 1975).
5
Yamamuro Shinichi, Kimera: Manshûkoku no shôzô (Chimera: A portrait of Manchukuo),
(Tokyo:Chûkôshinsho, 1993).
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state” and “independent state” paradigms in defining Manchukuo. The original work was
published in 1993 and won the Yoshino Sakuzô Prize, an influential academic prize
awarding distinguished works in the political, social and economic fields.
Regarding Manchukuo as a utopian adventure runs the risk of overvaluing the
political version held by the military idealists. Their political version and purpose reflects
the wishes of the metropole to secure its supremacy. It consequently does not transcend
the stereotype of imperialism, a “set of ideas of political, economic and cultural
domination of another territory” which is “generated primarily in the metropole.”6 By the
same token, considering Manchukuo as a puppet state or colony resulted in highlighting
the negative effects of Japanese rule on people‟s lives and failed to bring inquiry into the
wider effects of mass industrialization, urbanization, and modernization in Manchuria.
Since Manchukuo allowed the interplay of conjoined yet opposing factors, to detail just
another example of whether Manchukuo should be considered a puppet state, a colony or
an independent nation-state is less useful than to examine the requirements of a nation
state that it had already fulfilled or was still lacking.
The Nanjing government‟s appeal to the League of Nations did not end in vain.
The League of Nations sent a commission headed by V.A.G.R. Bulwer-Lytton to
investigate the causes of the Mukden Incident and to determine if the establishment of
Manchukuo reflected the wish of the local people as was claimed by the Japanese. After
spending six weeks in Manchuria and gleaning information from government leaders and
the ordinary people of Manchukuo, ROC and Japan, the Lytton investigation produced a
report titled “Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Sino-Japanese Dispute”,
6

Lori Watt, When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center : Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2009), 14.
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which is generally known as the Lytton Report.7 The report concludes that the military
operations of the Japanese troops on September 18, 1931 could not be regarded as
measures of legitimate self-defense, although they “did not exclude the hypothesis that
the officers on the spot may have thought they were acting in self-defense”.8 More
importantly, the sixth chapter of the Report suggests that it was the intention of the
Japanese government to define the relationship between Manchukuo and Japan.9 By
comparing the versions of China and Japan on the disputable events in Manchuria, the
Lytton Report provides comparatively objective sources for the League of Nations to
make judgment on the Sino-Japanese disputes of the region, which finally triggered
Japan‟s withdrawal from the League.
In order to weaken the negative effect that the Report might have had on the
validity of Manchukuo, Japan in September 1932 recognized Manchukuo. In the “JapanManchukuo Protocol,”10 Japan and Manchukuo confirmed the mutual respect for the
territorial rights of each other and arrived at an agreement that the Japanese military
would be stationed in Manchukuo so as to secure its national defense. Putting aside
Japan‟s de facto control of Manchukuo, the Protocol marked the first recognition of
Manchukuo as an independent state from the international community and sustained the
authenticity of Manchukuo in the perspective of international law. Until its abolishment
in 1945, Manchukuo had gained diplomatic recognition from at least eleven states,

7

Report of the Commission of Enquiry (The Lytton Report) is printed in Watanabe Shôichi‟s “Zenbun
Ritton Hôkokushô”. See Watanabe Shôichi, Zenbun Ritton Hokokushô (Report of Commission of Enquiry
into the Sino-Japanese Dispute), (Tokyo: Bijinesu sha, 2006).
8
Report of the Commission of Enquiry in Watanabe (2006, 75).
9
Ibid., 114.
10
Signed on September 15th 1932 at Xinjing. “Nichiman Kyoteisho” in Japanese and “Riman Xiedingshu”
in Chinese.
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including the Soviet Union in 1935 and non-ally states after the outbreak of World War
II.11 In addition to diplomatic recognition, which supported Manchukuo in meeting the
requirements for being a state, Manchukuo also possessed “all the symbolic formalities
possible of an independent nation: it had a head of state (the last Qing emperor, Puyi), a
national flag, an anthem, and a capital,” and even “a declaration of independence”.12
Consequently, one may ask what else objectively hindered Manchukuo from being an
authentic and legitimate political entity, except for the fact that the Manchukuo
government was manipulated by a foreign political power.
Yamamuro Shinichi‟s “Kimera” has provided the answer. Translated by Joshua A.
Fogel and re-titled Manchuria under Japanese Dominion in 2006, the work basically
sides with those who view Manchukuo as a puppet state being manipulated by the
Kwantung Army and labels it a chimera, with the head of the Kwantung Army, the body
of the submissive emperor system and the tail of a dragon (the Chinese emperor and
modern China).13 In addition to his contribution in filling in the blanks of standard
textbooks for the study of Japan‟s control of Manchuria, Yamamuro points out that the
absence of a nationality law meant that Manchukuo had failed to fulfill the minimum
requirement for being a modern legitimate state. Furthermore, he explains that the fact
that “a nationality law was never enacted was not due to the difficulties of legislative
techniques,” but instead, “the greatest impediment to promulgation of a nationality law
was the minds of the Japanese in Manchukuo who, while dubbing it an ideal state based

11

David Vance Tucker, “Building „Our Manchukuo‟: Japanese City Planning, Architecture, and NationBuilding in Occupied Northeast China” (Ph.D. diss., University of Iowa, 1999), 93-94.
12
Mariko Asano Tamanoi, “Knowledge, Power and Racial Classification: The „Japanese‟ in „Manchuria‟,”
The Journal of Asian Studies 59:2, (May, 2000), 252.
13
Yamamuro (2006, 8).
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on ethnic harmony and the kingly way, continued to refuse to separate themselves from
Japanese nationality and to take on Manchukuo nationality.”14 This explanation reveals a
Japanese-originated approach and overvalues the importance of Japanese residents in
Manchukuo. It downplays the importance of applying a Manchukuo nationality to other
non-Japanese Manchukuo residents, who were also part of the main constituents in
making a legitimate and authentic Manchukuo. Due to their nationality backgrounds,
different national groups presented particular problems to the legislation of a nationality
law in Manchukuo. Japanese refusal to give up their nationality should not be considered
solely responsible, but the nationality problems of other national groups were also
responsible. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the obstacles in obstructing Manchukuo
from having legitimate nationals beyond the Japanese version.
The main object of this thesis is to investigate the legal and political obstructions
that had prevented the Manchukuo government from establishing a viable nationality law.
It also attempts to find out Japan‟s perspective on the nationality issue, which helps
examine the metropole‟s political version of Manchuria. The thesis begins by taking a
look at the people‟s attitude toward the establishment of Manchukuo. It carries out a
close examination on public opinion by reviewing the Lytton Report and the telegrams
between Japanese officials in Manchuria and Tokyo.
Chapter two concentrates on the legal status of the former Republic of China
(ROC) citizens in Manchukuo. It investigates the possible restrictions that the ROC
nationality law might have placed on Manchukuo‟s legislation of a nationality law that
would include former ROC citizens. The thesis then moves to Chapter three to examine
14

Ibid., 211. Yamamuro uses “Manzhouguo” in his book. In order to maintain coherence and avoid
unnecessary misunderstanding, I changed “Manzhouguo” to “Manchukuo”.
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the legal status of those from the Empire of Japan (naichi in Japanese) in Manchukuo.
Naichi Japanese nationality law is brought into scrutiny to suggest that the naichi
nationality law had to be revised in order to grant dual nationality to Japanese living in
Manchukuo. The following chapter observes the historical background of Koreans,
whose nationality problem had exacerbated the earlier Sino-Japanese relationship from
the late Qing period. Moreover, it reveals the contradictions in Japan‟s “Japan and Korea
as one” slogan (naisen ittai in Japanese), the fundamental principle that Japan employed
in its rule over Korea. It also highlights the fact that Naichi nationality law had never
been enacted in Korea, a clear violation of the naisen ittai policy.
In addition to studying the positions of the main national groups under
Manchukuo‟s jurisdiction, Chapter four illustrates the legal position of other minority
groups, White Russians and Chinese coolies from China proper. In this chapter, it also
tries to shed light on Japan‟s principle towards the nationality issue by reviewing the
main legislation principles proposed by the Civil Law Council in 1939.
The thesis concludes that it was not only the refusal in the minds of the Japanese
that had prevented the draft of Manchukuo nationality law from being put into practice.
Rather, it was the conflicts between the future Manchukuo nationality law and the related
existing laws or principles that hindered the policy makers of Manchukuo from giving
priority to a nationality law. The ultimate failure to conclude a nationality law revealed
their inability to balance the interests among different groups and to dissolve the conflicts
or contradictions among the existing laws and political principles of the metropole, Korea
and the ROC. Although Japan might not have attempted to include Manchukuo into the
Empire, their granting precedence to the naichi belied the fact that the ideas they adopted

7

in dominating Manchukuo were generated from the metropole. The inconvenient truth
that Manchukuo was a state without a single legitimate person demonstrated the
inauthenticity of Manchukuo, helps us understand another element Manchukuo was in
need of in order to be considered an independent state. At the same time, it suggests that
it was impossible to create a nationality law as long as Manchukuo was within the
Empire of Japan.
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Chapter One
1. People’s Attitudes toward the Manchukuo Government
Rather than making Manchukuo another colony of the Empire of Japan, Japan
adopted the principle of international law to build an independent state in order to avoid
immediate military confrontation with the ROC and other interest groups. In support of
the independent nature of Manchukuo, the Japanese invited the dethroned Qing emperor,
Puyi, who had an earnest wish to restore the Qing dynasty, to be head of the new state.
Puyi‟s association in the Manchukuo government was aimed at contributing to the
legitimacy of the state due to the Manchus‟ historical connection with the land. However,
it is worth noting that Manchukuo was not established for Manchus but was designed to
be a multi-nation state that promised equality for all the people living there.
The “Announcement of the establishment of Manchukuo” (The Announcement),
publicized in March 1, 1932, is the most authoritative document in declaring the nature of
the new state. It first of all demonstrates that “the independence of Manchukuo was a
reflection of the wish of the thirty million inhabitants”. It continues by promising that all
people would be treated equally regardless of their national origin. Furthermore, it
suggests the principle of accepting new citizens by stating that “Chinese, Manchus,
Mongols, Japanese or Koreans, and other long-term residents of other national origins
would be granted the same equality”.15
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“Announcement of the establishment of Manchukuo” (Manchukuo Kenkoku Sengen) from Digital
Archive of the Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy: Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy 2:1:2 (Dec.
1931-Oct. 1932), “Manshûkoku no seiritsu to Nihon no shônin (The establishment of Manchukuo and
Japan’s Recognition), (Tokyo: MOFA), 414. See URL
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/
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The ideals of The Announcement might have been betrayed by confidential
correspondence between Japanese officials in Manchuria and the home government. For
example, a telegram, titled “About the critical attitude Manchurian citizens hold toward
Manchukuo” from Nagaoka, the acting Consulate-general of Harbin, to Yoshisawa
Foreign Minister on April 19th, 1932, reported the arrest of the leader of an antiManchukuo movement. Moreover, at the end of the telegram, he notes that local
inhabitants had very little awareness about the new state.16 Although the telegram does
not illustrate the degree and scale of the anti-Manchukuo movement, it at least admits
that Manchukuo was not supported by its people as much as described in The
Announcement.
In order to investigate the reasons which caused the absence of a nationality law
of Manchukuo, it is necessary to explore people‟s attitudes toward the new state, which in
turn helps in understanding the nature of the new state and the possibility of a viable
nationality law.
The official documents, which fully represented governmental opinion, likely
reflected little of the voice of the public, either the majority population or the minority
groups. Similarly, newspapers in Manchukuo became less and less reliable due to
Japanese censorship. It appears that the Japanese government had the right to suspend
news articles whose content were in conflict with the government‟s policies. For example,
from a telegram titled “About the suspension of articles of Japanese participation in the
new state” from Hayashi, Chief Director of the Kwantung Police Department to Horikiri
Zenjiro, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs on Feb. 19, 1932, one can see
16

Japan Digital Archive of the Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy Dec 1931- Oct. 1932: “Manshûkoku
no seiritsu to Nihon no shônin (The establishment of Manchukuo and Japan’s recognition), 493.
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how the Japanese Police executed their administrative power to control newspapers.17 In
the absence of reliable sources to investigate public opinion toward the new state, the
Lytton Report, a third-party investigation report on Manchukuo, becomes a very
important source to observe the attitude of local people toward the establishment of a new
state.
Generally, the population of Manchukuo at the time of the establishment of
Manchukuo was estimated to have been thirty million, as indicated in The Announcement.
To be more precise, Ohira Zengo‟s 1933 paper “The nationality issue of Manchukuo”
suggests that the total population was about thirty five million, in which Chinese
(including three million Manchus) occupied the majority, while Koreans (about one
million), Japanese (twenty two hundred thousand), and Russians (one hundred thousand)
made up the rest.18 As complex as the national origins of the Manchukuo population were
their attitudes toward the new state.
At the beginning of Chapter VI, Part III of the Lytton Report, it is explained that
ascertaining the attitude of the inhabitants of Manchuria toward the new state was one of
the objects of their mission. As a result, people‟s attitudes were important in judging if
Manchukuo was established through independent movements of the local people by the
League of Nations. It also served as an indicator of the authenticity of the new state. With
respect to the public attitude toward the new state, the Report arrived at the conclusion
that “there is no general Chinese support for the „Manchukuo Government‟” after talking

17

Ibid., 378.
Ohira Zengo, “Manshûkoku no Kokuseki Mondai” (The nationality issue of Manchukuo), Hôgaku
Kenkyu (Study of Law): Tokyo Shôka Daigaku Kenkyû Nenpô: 2, 1933, 284.
18
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with Chinese from different backgrounds living in Manchukuo. 19 The Commission
members talked with officials, gentry class members, businessmen, along with farmers
and workers, groups they thought were “politically uneducated, usually illiterate, and
normally take little interest in the Government”.20 Due to local Chinese farmers‟ past
disputes with Koreans, for example, the Wanbaoshan Affair, local Chinese farmers
resisted against the new state, where they thought their interests in land might be hurt.21
These comments challenged the claims made by the Manchukuo Government, which
emphasized the independent nature of the new state. However, in the wake of Japan‟s
military dominion of the region and the inability of the League‟s military sanction, the
majority population‟s opposition to the new state became silenced. Among the five major
national groups, Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Japanese and Korean, the Chinese were the
absolute majority of the population, and their participation in the new state also had an
important effect in weakening the ROC‟s nationalist movement. According to Duara, the
challenge from China‟s nationalist movement accelerated Japan‟s ambition to bring
Manchuria under its control.22
In contrast to the hostility by the Chinese majority toward the Manchukuo
government, the Lytton Commission found out that “the new Government received some
support from among various minority groups in Manchuria, such as the Mongols,
Koreans, White Russians and Manchus,” who had “in varying degrees suffered
oppression from the former administration or economic disadvantage from the large
19

Report of the Commission of Enquiry in Watanabe (2006, 120).
Ibid., (2006, 117).
21
Ibid., (2006, 64).
22
Duara, “Between Empire and Nation: Settler Colonialism in Manchukuo” in Settler Colonialists in the
20th Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies, ed. Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen (New York: Routledge,
2005), 59.
20
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immigration of Chinese in the last few decades.”23 Therefore, local Chinese
unwillingness and minority groups‟ support betrayed the Japanese claim that “the people
of Manchuria, at an opportune time when the old military power was overthrown,
established a new State with unity of endeavors and a single purpose.”24
On the other hand, the Chinese majority‟s resistance did not mean that they could
be exempted from being citizens of the new state. In other words, regardless of their
wishes, they might be granted Manchukuo nationality forcibly, with their original
nationalities taken into no consideration. By the same token, other minority groups‟
support for the new state was not a guarantee for their own citizenship in Manchukuo.
Their historical national backgrounds caused conflicts with their legal status in
Manchuria.
2. Japan’s Perspective on the Metropole’s Participation
According to The Announcement, both the Chinese majority and other minority
groups were supposed to hold the same citizenship and be governed equally under the
same jurisdiction. However, it is worth mentioning that at the beginning of the
establishment of Manchukuo, the Japanese did not seem to have determined to include
naichi Japanese as citizens in the new state. As evidenced by the telegram of February 19,
1932 mentioned above, the Kwantung Army even requested the home government for the
suspension of new articles dealing with the topics on Japanese participation in the new
government. They worried that Japanese participation might trigger anti-Japanese
movements among Manchurian residents. Similarly, in terms of Koreans‟ participation in
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Report of the Commission of Enquiry in Watanabe, (2006, 118).
Japan Digital Archive of the Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy Dec 1931- Oct. 1932: “Manshûkoku
no seiritsu to Nihon no shônin (The establishment of Manchukuo and Japan’s Recognition), 457.
24
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the new state, the Japanese expressed almost the same concern. This is supported by
another telegram from Nagaoka to Yoshisawa Foreign Minister on February 27, 1932,
which reveals that Japan decided not to release information on naichi Japanese and
Koreans‟ involvement in the new state which might call the dual nationality issue into
question.25
The uncertainty of incorporating subjects of the Empire of Japan into the new
state did not only exist in Japanese governmental opinion. Japanese activists also found it
inappropriate for Japanese to hold the same position as other national groups in the new
state. In the “Private outlook on the establishment of Manchukuo”, Tachibana Shiraki,
who held influential power on Manchukuo‟s policy making, suggests that “Manchukuo
should be an agricultural society under Chinese, Mongols, Manchus and Koreans” with
no mention of Japanese. 26 This does not suggest that the above-mentioned groups would
develop the new state independently. On the contrary, in the following paragraph,
Tachibana suggests Japan‟s leading and guiding position in the new state. The Lytton
Report revealed that the Japanese occupied many important positions in the Manchukuo
government and suggested that in important cases, Japanese officials and advisors had
followed the Japanese official authority.27
Japan might have hesitated to officially include naichi Japanese; they seemed to
have determined that Manchukuo should become a state providing all people with the
same equality. This was promised by law or other authoritative documents. Prior to

25

Japan Digital Archive of the Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy Dec 1931- Oct. 1932: “Manshûkoku
no seiritsu to Nihon no shônin (The establishment of Manchukuo and Japan’s Recognition), 409.
26
Tachibana Shiraki, “Manshû shinkokka kenkoku daikô shian” (Private outlook on the establishment of
Manchukuo), Manshûhyôron (Manchuria Review): 2:1, 1932, 30.
27
Report of the Commission of Enquiry in Watanabe (2006, 114).
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enacting a nationality law applicable for all the residents of Manchuria, the Manchukuo
government seems to have determined to grant political and economic equality even to
non-citizens. The draft of the Citizenship Bill prescribes that anyone living in
Manchukuo for more than five years was qualified for applying for citizenship as long as
they promised to obey Manchukuo law and the obligation of paying tax.28 The
willingness to offer foreigners citizenship revealed the eagerness of the Manchukuo
Government to attract more supporters.
In contrast to Japan‟s eagerness to enact a unitary nationality law, Chinese
officials displayed different perspectives on the issue. The Prime Minister of Manchukuo,
Zheng Xiaoxu made the following statement that “in order to unite the intelligent class of
Chinese and to attract the capable elites from Japan, it is wise not to make the state polity
clear and it is recommended that one avoid the rush to enact a nationality law.”29 Zhen‟s
overlooking of Japanese political ambition might suggest that Japan had not yet displayed
its ambition of ruling Manchukuo solely in 1932. Zhen, as the top official of the
government, resigned in 1935 in the wake of his political incompatibility with the
Kwantung Army. After that, fewer and fewer voices representing Chinese officials in the
Manchukuo government were recorded.
On the other hand, Manchukuo was a hierarchical society, with the Japanese
positioned at the top of the pyramid. By reserving better pay and higher living standards
for themselves, the Japanese betrayed their outward aspirations toward equality and
harmony. Based on the investigation by the Manchukuo Labor Corporation, the real

28

Japan Digital Archive of the Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy Dec 1931- Oct. 1932: “Manshûkoku
no seiritsu to Nihon no shônin (The establishment of Manchukuo and Japan’s Recognition), 502.
29
Quoted from Zhen Xiaoxu‟s statement made in May, 1932. Ohira (1932, 287-288).
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income of Japanese workers were about three times more than those of Chinese working
in the same factory.30 Tamanoi in her “Knowledge, Power and Racial Classification”
demonstrates the racial classification of Manchukuo population: those of Japanese and
Korean descent were classified as Nikkei and Senkei respectively, while those of Manchu
descent were classified as Mankei.31 Kei is a Japanese term to indicate one‟s decent and
origin. Mankei literally refers to those of Manchu decent. However, it is well-known that
the Japanese used Mankei to refer those non-Japanese officials in the Manchukuo
government. Tamanoi argues that Mankei did “connote the stark difference of power
between the largest population group and the „Japanese‟”.32 Due to different kei from
which they came, people in Manchukuo could be treated discriminately. Nikkei received
the most favorable treatment and Senkei were less favorable, but still better than Mankei.
The difference between Nikki and Mankei was reflected even in the dietary customs, with
Nikkei holding the right to eat rice, whereas Mankei were denied that right under the same
circumstances.33 To borrow Duara‟s words, these everyday discrimination practices
contradicted the rhetoric of concord.34
Regardless of the discrimination against different national groups, Manchukuo
became a dream factory by providing groups with different interests with the
opportunities to put their ambitions into practice. Those viewing Manchukuo as a
Japanese colony thought that it provided lifeline support for the empire by means of
standing as a military bulwark against Russia and China. Viewed from this colonialist
30

Yamamuro (2006, 200).
Tamanoi (2000, 255).
32
Tamanoi (2000, 257-260).
33
Yamamuro (2006, 200).
34
Duara Prasenjit, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern. (Lanham,
Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 77.
31
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perspective, Manchukuo purveyed goods and supplies for the home country and the
local-stationed Kwantung Army.35 With its vast land and no other power to contend with
the authority of the Kwangtung Army, Manchuria became a convenient continental
source for Japanese imperialists to exploit. Since the technology and human resources
from the naichi were desired by Manchukuo, it provided businessmen and urban
adventurers with opportunities in big cities, such as Dairen, to let them acquire favorable
modern living standards by employing Manchurian sources. On the other hand, it also
furnished arable land to make homes for the sheer amount of rural colonizers coming
from the home state.
As a matter of fact, with its broad land and plentiful agricultural resources,
Manchukuo became popular in attracting surplus rural population from the naichi. In
addition to functioning as a solution to solve the social problem in the naichi, promoting
rural immigration to Manchukuo was designed to enlarge the presence of the
underrepresented Japanese population. Many destitute Korean and Japanese rural
civilians had responded to the state mobilization call to move to rural towns. At the same
time, poor people from China proper also rushed to Manchuria to fill the scarcity of
manual labor in urban cities. Given the complicated backgrounds of its residents, it was
not easy to rule the state without a unitary yardstick. A nationality law was required in
order to put people with the same nationality under one jurisdiction. Consequently, in
addition to the original population of Manchukuo, rural immigration from the naichi or
the Chinese coolies also brought the Kwantung Army and Tokyo pressure to settle the
nationality problem to determine who should be granted citizenship and who should not.
35
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Chapter Two
Majority of Manchukuo citizens: Chinese with nationality of ROC
Asaono Toyomi suggests that the biggest problem faced by Japanese authorities‟
legislation of a Manchukuo nationality law lays in the naichi Japanese and Koreans.36
This statement was supported by Japan‟s repeated discussion and drafting focusing on
naichi Japanese and Koreans on the nationality law issue. Considering that the former
ROC citizens, mostly Han Chinese, constituted the main body of the Manchukuo citizens,
this Chapter sheds light on their legal status in Manchukuo and suggests that Japan‟s
overlooking of their situation reveals their disrespect of the ROC‟ s nationality law.
The Lytton Report demonstrates that the Chinese were reluctant and against
becoming Manchukuo citizens. From the perspective of nationality law, their compulsory
participation was not an automatic renouncement of ROC nationality. Nevertheless,
Japan seemed to have completely ignored the fact that the Chinese in Manchukuo were
still citizens of the ROC even after the Manchukuo Government was established from the
principle of law.
Based on the principle of territorial jurisdiction, the Manchukuo government held
jurisdiction over citizens living in Manchukuo, which was secured by Japan‟s military
power. On the other hand, were the principle of jurisdiction based on the nationality of
the person adopted, the Manchukuo government would have had no right to execute the
right of jurisdiction until a Manchukuo nationality was applied to those in question.
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In contrast, approving citizenship for the Chinese in Manchukuo did not raise
questions on its violation of the ROC nationality law. It was considered that the effects of
the jurisdiction of the ROC were eliminated with Japan‟s removal of ROC military power
in the region. In other words, since the ROC did not employ legal action to protect the
Chinese in Manchukuo, they became “stateless”, and it was unnecessary for Japan to take
their former nationality into account when granting them Manchukuo nationality.
However, considering the fragility of Manchukuo as an independent state, enactment of a
nationality law was meant to put all the people under one jurisdiction. It also touched
upon the problem of legitimacy of Manchukuo. As suggested by Ohira‟s “The nationality
issue of Manchukuo”, a viable nationality law must respect the cooperation with the laws
of the ROC and an agreement about nationality issue should be concluded.37
The nationality law of the ROC, which was promulgated by the Nationalist
Government on February 5, 1929 adopted the same jus sanguinis principle as Japan‟s
nationality law had done. Article 11 states that one will lose his or her Chinese nationality
when (s)he voluntarily obtained the foreign nationality under the permission of the
Ministry of the Interior. Additionally, (s)he must be over twenty years old and be
considered to have Chinese law-based behavioral competence. Article 12 forbids the
Ministry of the Interior to approve the renouncement of Chinese nationality to those who
are liable to military service both currently and in the future, and to those working for the
government.38 Consequently, Article 11 and Article 12 disqualified at least two groups of
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nationals from giving up Chinese nationality. First of all, it denied the effectiveness of
those who obtained foreign nationality without permission from the Ministry of the
Interior. In the case of the Chinese in Manchukuo, their becoming nationals of
Manchukuo lacked volition; moreover, their acquisition of Manchukuo nationality was
impossible to be granted permission because there was almost no prospect for the ROC to
recognize Manchukuo as an independent state. In fact, not only did the Lytton Report
negate Japan‟s claim that the establishment of Manchukuo originated from the wish of
the local residents, mostly Chinese, but it was also within Japanese knowledge that the
new state might be against the local Chinese and might provoke anti-Japanese sentiment.
In a telegram from Nagaoka to Saito Foreign Minister on June 25, 1932, Nagoya pointed
out that local Chinese‟ anti-Japanese sentiment was strong. One can see that the Japanese
had paid close attention toward the local Chinese who were opposed to the new state and
had kept vigilance over Chinese reaction toward Japan‟s recognition of Manchukuo.39 It
once again belied Japan‟s claim that building a new state was a reflection of the
Manchurian people‟s will.
It is worth noting that the ROC had never recognized Manchukuo as an
independent state, which means that the ROC had not given up its dominion of the
Chinese living in the territory of Manchukuo. In other words, as long as the ROC did not
give up its sovereignty of Manchuria, the ROC‟s nationality law was still considered to
be effective in the region.
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The second group who were denied the right to obtain a new nationality regulated
in ROC‟s 1929 nationality law refers to Chinese people living in Manchuria under twenty
years old. As a result, from the perspective of the ROC, Chinese people living in
Manchukuo under twenty years of age were still citizens of the ROC and theoretically
had to serve the duties as a ROC national, such as military service as required by ROC
law. If the nationality law of the ROC were to be respected, the Manchukuo government
would have had to take two elements into consideration when making their own
nationality law. One was permission from the Ministry of Interior of the ROC, the other,
the group under twenty, whose acquisition of a new nationality required special legal
measures to be taken.
Regardless of the importance of the cooperation or agreement Manchukuo
government needed to gain from the ROC toward the nationality issue, there is no
evidence to support that Manchukuo officials had ever attempted to solve the problems
through diplomatic routes. On the other hand, they were aware of the complications by
including former ROC citizens into the new state. They might have noticed that it was not
persuasive enough to change one‟s identity without relying on related laws or ordinances.
As a result, along with the legislation of nationality or citizenship law, the Manchukuo
government attempted to weaken the sense of identity of former ROC citizens, the Han
Chinese in particular. As mentioned in Chapter one, Tamanoi demonstrates that unlike
Japanese or Koreans, who were classified as Nikkei or Senkei, there was no official
category for the Han Chinese to indicate their identity.40 This indicates Japan‟s attempts
to deny the historical identity of the Chinese living in Manchukuo. In the absence of
40
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evidence to explain their motivation, Mankei as a racial classification to identify Han
Chinese suggests that Japan wanted to deny any connection between the ROC and
Manchuria so as to justify their establishment of Manchukuo. Furthermore, whether or
not Mankei was an acceptable term for the Han Chinese to identify themselves, it was not
just an imaginary term to force the Han Chinese to disrespect their heritage; it blurred the
racial or national differences between Manchus, Mongols and Han Chinese.
On the other hand, Japan kept spending effort on drafting a viable nationality law.
In fact, earlier from 1932 to 1936, there had been at least seven proposals or drafts of a
nationality law of Manchukuo made by related departments and jurists. According to
Endô‟s summary, they included: 1) “Manchukuo‟s nationality problem” by the fifth
section of economy research department of SMR in July 1932; 2) “Advice on
Manchukuo‟s nationality issue” in August 1932; 3) “The nationality issue of Manchukuo”
by Ohira Zengo in September 1932 representing the Ministry of Justice of Manchukuo; 4)
“Manchukuo‟s nationality problem” in September 1934; 5) “On the enactment of
Manchukuo nationality law” by the fifth commission of special mission department of the
Kwantung Army in January 1934; and 6) “Regarding the nationality issue in Manchukuo”
by Katakura Tadashi representing the Kwantung Army in July 1934. In addition, in the
May of 1936, Hidefumi Matsuba, who worked for the Department of Foreign Affairs of
Korean General Government, published the “Draft of Manchukuo nationality law”, which
represented the opinions of the Korean side. Other than Ohira‟s draft, which mentioned
the compatibility between the ROC‟s nationality law and that of Manchukuo, the other
proposals seemed to have concentrated on the status of naichi Japanese and Koreans in
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Manchukuo.41 This might have been due to the interest groups they stood for and their
own backgrounds. For example, Ohira was the Professor of international law at Tokyo
Shôka University, the forerunner of Hitotsubashi University. His academic background as
jurist in international law allowed him to take into account the possible conflicts between
the laws of ROC and of Manchukuo. In contrast, the other proposals written by
bureaucrats might have been more practical by ignoring the trouble ROC nationality law
would have brought to the establishment of Manchukuo‟s own nationality law. As a
result, regardless of Japan‟s attempt to borrow international law to ennoble their militaryoccupied region to a civilian legitimate state, their disregard of the dispute between the
ROC and Manchukuo did not help accelerate the progress of the enactment of a
nationality law in Manchukuo. Their concern of naichi law only gave credit to the fact
that Manchukuo‟s policies were generated from the metropole.
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Chapter Three
Quasi-Citizens: Japanese from Naichi
In its introduction of the organization of the Manchukuo government, the Lytton
Report notes the prominent status of Japanese officials in the new state. It points out that
“Japanese advisers are attached to all important departments” and suggests that it was the
Japanese who “exercise the greatest measure of actual power.”42 According to the
information published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), about two hundred
thirty Japanese were assigned important positions in the Manchukuo government at the
time of April 1932.43 Taking a look at the details of the positions to which these Japanese
were appointed, one may find that those positions were no longer merely advisors to
Manchukuo government, but rather important positions which were supposed to be
appointed exclusively to citizens of that country.
The legal status of Japanese officials in Manchukuo government was only the tip
of the iceberg. In fact, there were twenty two hundred thousand Japanese living in
Manchukuo with their nationality unsettled.44 Except for the high-level officials in the
government, troops of the Kwantung Army and other governmental related employees,
the Japanese population was mainly composed of two groups: urban settlers and rural
settlers. The urban settlers constituted an elite class among which many were employees
of the SMR and its affiliated subsidy companies. The rush of infrastructure building and
the need of employees for Japanese companies in big cities attracted thousands of
Japanese to settle in Manchuria. For example, the employees of SMR and its affiliated
42
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subsidiaries climbed to 140,000 at the peak of employment.45 Not only did they maintain
their metropolitan living standards, but they also enjoyed political privileges and secured
a decent income, which were competitive to those given the same position in the
metropole. On the other hand, the rural settlers were mobilized to Manchukuo through
the “One Million Household Emigration Plan” by the Ministry of Colonial Affairs in
1936. In this project, the Japanese government aimed to increase the Japanese population
in Manchukuo to ten percent of the total population in twenty years. In fact, the project
had successfully sent more than 300,000 rural people to Manchukuo by 1945.46 The
population of rural settlers finally exceeded urban settlers through the immigration
project, and their settlement in Manchukuo was more permanent than urban settlers due
to their determination to bury their bones in Manchukuo.47
The “Independent Announcement” that Department of Foreign Affairs of
Manchukuo government had sent to the international community asked for formal
diplomatic relations with Manchukuo to be established.48 Japan responded to the appeal
by recognizing Manchukuo and Manchukuo government in 1932. As a result, the
relationship between Japan and Manchukuo was supposed to be as equal as any other
diplomatic relation between two other independent states. Japanese in Manchukuo were
foreigners with political privilege, which was the negative legacy Manchukuo had
inherited from the ROC. However, the Japanese were not simply foreigners in
Manchukuo due to their particular contribution to the establishment of the new state.
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They were included into the five races constituting the population of Manchukuo. The
dual roles of Japanese as “foreigner” and “citizen” caused confusion regarding the
identity of the Japanese. More precisely, were the Japanese living in Manchukuo citizens
of Manchukuo, or were they still nationals of the Empire of Japan?
Putting aside their own will, this is not a question easily answered in the absence
of a nationality law of Manchukuo. Nevertheless, this is the problem that Manchukuo had
to solve so as to maintain its legitimacy as an independent state. It is more than an issue
concerning the identity of the Japanese or the nature of Manchukuo – it affords an
example to examine Japanese imperialism and their political goals in Manchukuo. In
order to understand the complexity of the nationality issue of naichi Japanese in
Manchukuo, it is necessary to review the complicated speculations of the founders of
Manchukuo, who attempted to make their occupation of Manchukuo different from that
of Korea and Taiwan.
While the establishment of Manchukuo included collaboration from the local
Chinese, it first of all embodied the Japanese militarists‟ radicalism and idealism in
building a state “with healthy financial, industrial and commercial institutions of its own,
trading freely and profitably with Japan but not to be economically exhausted and
thereafter to become dependent on Japan”.49 If this were the ideal of Japanese imperialists,
their rule of Manchuria ought not to be considered the same as that of Korea and Taiwan,
in which Japan claimed absolute authority while Korea and Taiwan played a subordinate
role in supporting the empire. By the same token, the status of the Japanese in
Manchukuo was different from those in Korea and Taiwan. Naichi Japanese in Korea and
49
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Taiwan were not foreigners. Instead, they were privileged colonizers from the metropole
since both Korea and Taiwan were part of the Empire of Japan. It was therefore
unnecessary for Japan to build any diplomatic relations with the two regions since they
were colonies of the Empire. In contrast, the relationship between Japan and Manchukuo
was supposed to be equal and naichi Japanese were considered to be foreigners in
Manchukuo.
As mentioned before, contradictions arose after the Japanese population became
considered one of the five main groups of Manchukuo, which revealed the Japanese
founders‟ wish to build a multi-national community against the growing nationalism in
the ROC. In order to put Manchukuo‟s slogan “five races under one roof” into practice, it
was imperative to grant all the people in Manchukuo citizenship. However, this was not
an unspoken agreement; rather it demanded that the law guarantee that the Japanese in
Manchukuo would receive the same citizenship as the other four races, as what was
promised in The Announcement and other important documents. However, as
Yamamuro has pointed out, the Japanese must have resisted giving up their original
nationality. Unlike the Chinese, whose wishes might have been unfavorably ignored due
to the lack of the representatives to speak for them, Japanese residents, both urban and
rural settlers, would not have their requests simply disregarded. As a result, Japanese
desire for keeping their Japanese nationality became a headache for the Manchukuo
government, who preferred making them people of Manchukuo.
In fact, early on from the end of 1931, there was a movement by radical Japanese
imperialists for the Japanese to renounce their nationality so as to incorporate themselves
into the five races. In a telegram from Morishima, acting Consulate-general of Fengtian,
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to the Home Ministry on November 30, 1931, Morishima reported that the “impractical”
suggestion of renouncement of nationality should not be ignored.50 According to Endô,
when the calendar moved to 1932, the Kwantung Army, local Japanese political power
and the home government began to conduct research on the viability of a dual nationality
law. Moreover, Endô suggests that the Japanese government was not encouraged to see
its own people to change their nationality.51 In order not to lose its own people, the home
government and the Kwantung Army had to conceive of a dual nationality or citizenship.
However, this could become a solution only under the condition that the nationality law
of the Empire of Japan would allow dual nationality.
According to the naichi nationality law, dual nationality was not allowed because
naichi nationality law stipulated that one would lose his or her Japanese nationality once
(s)he acquires a foreign nationality by kika, a Japanese term of naturalization.52 Therefore,
granting Japanese in Manchukuo dual nationality or citizenship challenges the naichi
principle. Moreover, considering ordinary Japanese hesitation to completely sever with
the naichi, it seems that creating a dual nationality might have been the only effective
way for incorporating Japanese into the new state without sacrificing their own interests
in the naichi. This could not be possible without revising the naichi nationality law. It
remains unclear why the lawmakers failed to revise the law in the absence of historical
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evidence; it is less disputable to say that the pressure of war distracted the imperialists
from concentrating on putting their ideals into practice.
Meanwhile, the failure in changing the naichi law to support the enactment of
Manchukuo law did not weaken the ambition of the Kwantung Army to put all the races
under the same jurisdiction. In fact, earlier in January of 1932, the Japanese were
prepared to abolish the extraterritoriality for Japanese residents for the new state. In a
telegram from Ohashi, the Consulate-general of Harbin to Yoshisawa Foreign Minister
on January 23, 1932, Ohashi reported that extraterritoriality would be abolished as soon
as enough jurists and police power were well-equipped for the new state.53 The
Manchukuo government signed a treaty with the Japanese government to abolish
extraterritoriality for Japanese residents in 1936. According to Han Suk-Jung, “there was
a demonstration by the Japanese residents in Fengtian to protest this series of unpleasant
measures, and the Board of the Manchukuo Police finally sent instructions to all local
branches, saying that they must make every effort not to provoke Japanese residents”.54 It
seems that the Kwantung Army abolished the Japanese political privileges at the expense
of causing resistance from the Japanese residents. Concerning this issue, sociologist
Hyun Ok Park provides a different perspective by suggesting that the dispossession of the
symbolic political privilege of Japanese subjects in Manchuria had little to do with the
sovereignty issue than with the Kwantung Army‟s political struggle with the home
government. She argues that the Kwantung Army wanted to decrease the intervention
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from the MOFA in Manchukuo by limiting the MOFA‟s jurisdiction to the least extent.55
Whether or not the renunciation of extraterritoriality was really in the interests of
Manchukuo, it nevertheless substantiated the sovereignty of the new state. This is
supported by Yamamuro‟s argument that the abrogation of extraterritoriality had outfitted
Manchukuo with the appearance of an independent state.56 The abolishment of the
colonizers‟ political privilege contributed to maintaining the form of sovereignty and
fulfilling the requirement of the formalism of equality.
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Chapter Four
Citizens with dual nationalities: Koreans in Manchukuo
Another main problem faced by the Japanese in enacting a viable nationality law
in Manchukuo was the issue of Koreans‟ nationality. Compared with the Chinese and
Japanese legal status in Manchukuo, the nationality issue of Koreans in Manchukuo had
attracted more attention from the international community. The Lytton Report
highlighted the dual nationality issue of Koreans as one of the most important concerns of
“Manchurian issues between Japan and China”.57 One reason for the Lytton
Commission‟s particular attention to the Korean problem was that they believed their
problems, including the right of leasing land and their citizenship, had “served to
accentuate the conflict of policies of China and of Japan.”58
When the Lytton Commission conducted the investigation on Sino-Japanese
conflicts in 1932, it was said that the population of Korean residents in Manchukuo was
eight hundred thousand, while almost half of them lived in Jiandao (Kando in
Japanese),59 a marsh land between Yanbian region and Long county in northeast China.
In the late period of the Qing, Koreans in poverty immigrated to Jiandao for land and jobs.
Although the immigration was not encouraged, the Qing court adopted a positive policy
toward the issue. The Qing court even set up a bureau to recruit Korean immigrants to
cultivate the land. In 1890, Korean immigrants from the Korean peninsula who moved to
Manchuria and cultivated the land and worked on agricultural production were allowed to
be subjected to the law of Qing upon their agreement of the tifayifu policy, a Chinese
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term which required Koreans to change their hair style and clothing custom to those of
Qing.60
One year before Japan‟s annexation of Korea, Japan and the Qing signed a
protocol related to the Kando issue in 1909. In this Protocol, Japan acknowledged the
Qing Empire‟s reign of Koreans living in Kando, while the Qing court approved the right
of residency and land acquisition of Koreans. After the Annexation of Korea and the fall
of the Qing Empire, Japan demanded that “Koreans were entitled, as Japanese subjects, to
the privileges of land-leasing acquired by Japan in the Treaty and Notes of 1915.”61 A
document titled “The problems of Koreans in Manchuria” provides clues to Japan‟s
official attitude toward the situation of Koreans in Manchuria.62 It is unclear when the
document was recorded; however, from the content, it is reasonable to say that it was
written before 1932, since it does not touch on the establishment of Manchukuo. The
document suggests that there was no hurry to settle the nationality issue since the Chinese
side might use this to deny the Koreans‟ already obtained land-leasing right as
naturalized Chinese. The document also proposes that it was necessary to deny the
naturalization right of Koreans for the sake of cracking down on the futeisenjin, a
discriminatory Japanese term to define Koreans who were against Japan with the purpose
to restore the autonomy of Korea.63 In other words, Japan did not allow Koreans‟
naturalization to become Chinese. This was because the futeisenjin might have taken
advantage of the naturalization right to evade Japan‟s crackdown, which would have
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resulted in inconvenience for Japan to keep order in Jiandao, a base of futeisenjin‟s antiJapanese activities. As long as Koreans were denied the right to give up their newlyentitled Japanese nationality, Japan was authorized to suppress suspected Koreans,
provided the principle of jurisdiction was based on the nationality of the person, wherever
they were.
Japan‟s claim of its control of Koreans in Manchuria, Jiandao in particular,
resulted in the maintenance of consular police to execute the extraterritoriality right. It
seems that Japan had employed the consular police power to investigate and crack down
on the futeisenjin. This is supported by the statement made by the Lytton Report that
“whether the Koreans desired such Japanese interference, ostensibly in their behalf, or
not, the Japanese consular police, especially in the Jiantao District, undertook protective
functions and freely assumed the right to conduct searches and seizures of Korean
premises, especially where the Koreans were suspected of being involved in the
independence movement, or in Communist or anti-Japanese activities.”64
Japan‟s insistence on denying the naturalization right of Koreans was
strengthened in the wake of the Jiandao Incident in 1920. The Japanese consulate in
Huichun was attacked by unknown bandits, and Koreans and dozens of Japanese were
left dead in riots. Japan was convinced that Kando had become a hotbed for Koreans in
exile to develop the independent movement against Japan because of its geographic
position and historical connection with Korea.65 As revealed in the Jiandao Incident,
Japan‟s suppression of Koreans ran the risk of violating the sovereignty of the ROC and
even of triggering a military confrontation between China and Japan. In fear of Japan‟s
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invasion of Kando in the name of cracking down on its own citizens, the Chinese
government was positive to Koreans‟ naturalization to become Chinese, so as to preclude
the expansion of Japan‟s presence.66 According to Endô, three months after the JapanKorea Annexation in 1895, the government-general of the Northeast three provinces of
the Qing court suggested that the central government give special treatment toward the
local Koreans in terms of their nationality in order to avoid a Japanese invasion of
Manchuria.
Both Japan and China‟s nationality policies toward Koreans in Manchuria did not
change much after the 1920s in that Japan continued to insist its dominion over Koreans
in Manchuria, while the ROC held on to its sovereignty of the region. However, with its
rising power in the region, Japan had enlarged its presence in the region under the
pretense of protecting its own nationals, here, the Koreans. For example, prior to the
Mukden Incident, a dispute on land between Chinese and Korean farmers caused
interference from Japanese police and developed into the Wanbaoshan Incident, which
ended up with Koreans‟ anti-Chinese movement in Korea. The Jiandao Incident and the
Wanbaoshan Incident were clear manifestations of the fact that the ROC and Japan would
have many unexpected disputes as long as the nationality of Koreans in Manchuria
remained unsettled.
The nationality issue of Koreans in Manchukuo had already been a headache for
both China and Japan before the Mukden Incident and the complexity of Koreans‟
nationality reached its climax under the establishment of Manchukuo, which entitled
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those who had already obtained Chinese nationalities to become de facto dual nationality
holders.
The establishment of Manchukuo resulted in the exclusion of the ROC‟s police
presence in Manchuria; however, it was not a solution for the nationality problem of
Koreans. In fact, including Koreans into the five races and creating a nationality of the
new state put Japanese into the horns of a dilemma, now that they were faced with the
conflicts among naichi nationality law, the naisen ittai principle, and the future
Manchukuo nationality law. As concluded by the Lytton Report, although the Japanese
nationality law of 1924 regulates those who acquired foreign nationality to automatically
lose Japanese nationality, “this general law has never been made applicable to the
Koreans by special Imperial Ordinance.”67 In other words, since Japanese nationality
laws had never permitted Koreans to give up their Japanese nationality, Koreans‟
naturalization to foreign countries, for example, becoming Chinese through naturalization,
was not effective from the perspective of the Empire of Japan. By the same token, the
Japanese were caught in the same trap when it was their turn to make Koreans citizens of
Manchukuo. If Koreans were denied the right to naturalize themselves to be Chinese due
to the lack of a nationality law, then it would also be impossible for them to become
citizens of Manchukuo.
The rivalry between Japan and the ROC toward the nationality problem of
Koreans in Manchuria did not last long. Because of the Nanjing government‟s nonresistance policy, the ROC lost its presence, both politically and militarily in Manchuria,
and their insistence of their sovereignty of the region became powerless with the
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establishment of Manchukuo. However, the problem of Koreans‟ nationality still
remained unsolved. The focus of the conflicts moved from the confrontation between the
ROC and Japan to internal incompatibility between the naichi and Manchukuo.
For the Koreans living in Manchukuo, the first step toward becoming Manchukuo
citizens was to give up their Japanese nationality, which was granted by the Annexation
Protocol. However, the lack of a nationality law in Korea made it impossible for Koreans
to give up their nationality as Japanese, so that it was impracticable to obtain Manchukuo
nationality. Consequently, in order to create a unitary nationality in Manchukuo, it was
necessary to first of all enact a nationality law in Korea which allowed Koreans‟
naturalization to another country. However, the application of naichi nationality law in
Korea was not easy. In the 49th Empire Congress, the first meeting of the House of
Representatives, Senator Makiyama Kôzô questioned why the naichi nationality law had
not been enacted in Korea. He criticized that the denial of naturalization rights of
Koreans was a discriminatory policy and violated the naisen ittai policy. His question
was not answered until November 1925. The Korean General Government (sotokufu in
Japanese) explained that the non-application of naichi nationality law in Korea resulted
from the needs of cracking down on the anti-Japanese or Korean independence
movements, which was consistent with the document “The problems of Koreans in
Manchuria” cited above. In other words, the naichi government had given priority to the
futeisenjin issue at the expense of disrespecting the naisen ittai principle.68
Koreans remained the subjects of the Empire of Japan until the end of WWII.
Their nationality issue unveiled the legal conflicts between the metropole and the empire
68
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to its full amount. In conclusion, it was Japan‟s denial of Koreans‟ naturalization right
which delayed the legislation process of nationality law in Manchukuo. Not unlike how
granting Japanese dual nationality necessitated the revision of naichi nationality law,
entitling Koreans to become citizens of Manchukuo required first of all the application of
naichi nationality law in Korea. Only by applying naichi nationality law in Korea could
Koreans give up their Japanese citizenship so as to acquire the citizenship of Manchukuo.
The naichi‟s hesitation to enact a nationality law illustrates their fear of an independence
movement from Korea and also demonstrates the fragility of the Empire. Although the
Empire of Japan eventually was destroyed from without, the metropole had never lost its
vigilance toward the destructive power from within. The harmony between the metropole
and the empire was maintained by the military power, and the principle of “rule by the
law” was a convenient tool for manipulation for the metropole whenever necessary.

37

Chapter Five
1. Other minority groups: White Russians and Chinese Coolies
Although in Manchukuo‟s declaration of independence only five races, Chinese,
Manchus, Mongols, Japanese and Koreans, were mentioned to be incorporated into the
new state, there were in fact other minority groups which the Manchukuo government
considered for inclusion. The Manchukuo government attempted to grant citizenship to
the White Russians living in Manchukuo, who fled from the Russian Revolution to
Manchuria, mostly “in and around Harbin” and worked for the East China Railway
(Dongzhi Tiedao in Chinese) and its related corporations. Their population had already
climbed to 150,000 in 1922. 69 When the Lytton Commission visited Manchukuo in 1932,
their population was estimated to be “at least 100,000”.70 These White Russians
decreased to 50,000 afterward due to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R)
transfer of the possession of the East Asian Railway to Manchukuo in 1939. 71
The Lytton Commission reported that the White Russians in Manchuria claimed
to have suffered from the local Chinese officials and police and that there was “no
national Government to protect them.” 72 According to the data provided by SMR, 70,053
White Russians were stateless, while 28,072 held Russian nationality in 1933.73 Because
of their Russian background, the SMG concluded in its research report that “White
Russians might play an important role in the future military conflicts between Japan and
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Russia”.74 In the wake of the importance of Japan and Manchukuo‟s diplomatic
relationship with the U.S.S.R, granting stateless White Russians nationality required very
careful and sensitive political judgment.75
On the other hand, in the Report titled “The White Russian Problem” made by the
first section of European-Asian Department of MOFA, it is recorded that in November
1932, the Ministry of Police in Fengtian and Shenyang issued the “Order of
Naturalization Procedure of White Russians”. It calls attention to the inconvenience of
managing the residential problems of stateless residents. It provided that White Russians
who had property and occupation and submitted a document to promise naturalization
would be endowed with the same equal status as original residents of Manchukuo.
Concerning refugees and those without occupation, the order also showed flexibility by
allowing them to join the new state as long as they could show loyalty toward the
Manchukuo government. This order revealed the basic principles of the Manchukuo
government toward the legal status of White Russians in Manchukuo. However, this was
no more than an administrative measure due to the lack of support by a nationality law.76
Nevertheless, it reflected the general attitude Japan had toward the nationality issue of
White Russians, that is, they were positive in incorporating them into the new state both
for the government and for the diversity of the Manchukuo population.
In contrast, the Japanese attitude toward coolies from the ROC was less positive.
In 1931, the number of coolies coming to Manchukuo was 416,825, and there was only a
slight decrease in 1932 under the influence of the Mukden Incident. From 1933, it seems
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that more coolies were coming to Manchukuo to look for jobs. The year of 1934 marks
the peak of the coolies‟ entry to Manchukuo, which amounted to 627,322.77 It was also
the same year that the Manchukuo government decided that the Chinese entering
Manchukuo would be considered foreigners. In the first meeting of the Labor Regulation
Committee, which opened in January 1934, a committee member suggested that if the
entry of coolies were not limited, Manchukuo would become a colony of the ROC. As a
result, it is not difficult to see that Japan saw coolies as a threat to both local employment
and the stability of Manchukuo society. They were even worried that coolies‟ entry to
Manchukuo would trigger the nationalism of the Chinese, former ROC citizens. 78
This attitude was also supported by Japan‟s general attitude toward the Chinese
even before the establishment of Manchukuo. In the preparation of the opening of the
Manchurian-Mongolian Council in February 1932, the home government provided drafts
of important policies of Manchukuo. In terms of immigration policy, they encouraged
Korean, naichi Japanese, and Russian immigration to Manchukuo. In contrast, in terms of
Chinese immigration, rather than giving any sort of encouragement, they placed
restrictions on immigration from China. The 1934 restriction on coolies‟ entrance to
Manchukuo was consistent with this policy.79 Treating coolies as foreigners was intended
to weaken the presence of the Chinese so as to avoid the rise of a nationalist movement in
Manchukuo.
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Neither the nationality issue of White Russians nor that of coolies was the main
concern of Manchukuo‟s nationality law; however, their existence made the legislation
process of the nationality law more complicated. Japan‟s willingness to include the White
Russians reveals its ambition to build an international community. By the same token, its
exclusion of the coolies might indicate that they saw Chinese as a threat to the stability of
Manchukuo.
Chapter two has illustrated the Chinese legal situation in Manchukuo and Japan‟s
ignorance of the ROC nationality law in making them citizens of the new state.
Theoretically, it was sensible for the Manchukuo government to arrive at a diplomatic
agreement with the ROC government to settle the nationality of former ROC citizens, as
suggested by Ohira. However, it might not have been necessary as long as the ROC was
not intending to confront Japan on this issue. As a result, it allowed policy makers to
concentrate exclusively on drafting a nationality law in harmony with naichi law and the
naisen ittai principle.
2. The legislation of a nationality law in 1939
As suggested in Chapter three, the abolishment of extraterritoriality of naichi
Japanese in Manchukuo left an important mark in the legislation process of nationality
law. It reveals the determination of Japan to ennoble Manchukuo to an independent state
with which Japan would have liked to build more equal diplomatic relations, even if only
nominally. From a more practical perspective, it at least eliminated political hindrance
from putting the “five races equality” slogan into practice. As a result, the legislation of a
nationality law became more hopeful, and the policy makers‟ outlook on the issue was
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supposed to be more thoughtful and practical after many discussions and trial and error
from 1932.
In fact, the Civil Law Council was organized in December 1938,80 which was
responsible for the legislation of identification law. In January of 1939, under the
leadership of the Civil Law Council, a “Secretary Preparation Commission of the
Legislation of the Nationality Law” was organized with the participation from
governmental departments, such as the Management and Coordination Agency (Somucho
in Japanese), the Foreign Affairs Department (Gaimukyoku in Japanese), and the
Concordia Party (Kyowakai in Japanese).
According to Endô‟s summary, the main points of the legislation principles for
the nationality law outline are concluded as follows:
1. The Manchukuo nationality is to be endowed to all the five races living in Manchukuo,
including Japanese, Manchus, Chinese, Koreans and Mongols.
2. It is forbidden to reserve the right to choose nationality.
3. The principle of jus sanguinis is adopted as the principle of nationality acquisition.
4. Dual nationality is allowed only in the cases of naichi Japanese and Koreans.
5. The officials of the Manchukuo government, staff of Concordia Party and employees of
special companies who had Manchukuo as their living base should acquire Manchukuo
nationality.
6. Coolies from China belong to category “foreigners” in Manchukuo.
7. White Russians who held living bases in Manchukuo are allowed to acquire nationality
through naturalization.
8. One will lose Manchukuo nationality upon losing one‟s living base in Manchukuo. 81
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It is worth noting that this might have been the first time for the Manchukuo
government to admit the effectiveness of dual nationality. Rather than seeing the special
status of naichi Japanese or Koreans in Manchukuo, item four revealed a strong bond
between the Empire of Japan and Manchukuo. This item reiterates that there was no
political conflict in being a citizen of Japan and one of Manchukuo at the same time. On
the other hand, the requirement of Manchukuo officials and government-related
employees to acquire the nationality provides a solution to solve the contradiction that
Manchukuo was ruled by foreigners. This had threatened the independent nature of the
government even since 1932. On the other hand, considering the attitude toward coolies,
it only confirmed that the inflow or outflow of human resources was not encouraged. By
classifying coolies as foreigners, the local administrations were aided in the management
of their movement into Manchukuo so as to stem anti-Japanese influence in the new state.
In contrast, it is not difficult to see that the Manchukuo government was positive in
including stateless White Russians. To allow them to acquire Manchukuo nationality
through naturalization helped avoid diplomatic confrontation with the U.S.S.R
In terms of the nationality problem of naichi Japanese, the 1939 draft of a
nationality law could have been viable as long as the naichi would agree to revise its
nationality law to allow dual nationality. Similarly, it seems that the nationality problem
of Koreans would also have been solved under the condition that the naichi nationality
law be enacted in Korea. Since both the revision of the naichi nationality law and the
enactment nationality law in Korea would have taken a great deal of time, it was due to
the war that Manchukuo had failed to have a nationality law. Nevertheless, this is not to
suggest that it is meaningless to reveal the hardships in the legislation process of a
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nationality law. Indeed, restoring the contradictions to its historical significance helps in
understanding the distance between the ideals and the reality of Japan‟s construction of
Manchukuo and people of Manchukuo.

44

Conclusion
Following Yamamuro‟s observation of the contradiction of Manchukuo‟s
authenticity as a national state in terms of nationality law, it seems that more and more
historians began to pay attention to the nationality issue of Manchukuo. Asano Toyomi in
his “The Extraterritoriality and Nationality Law issue in Manchukuo” analyzes the
connection between the abolishment of the Japanese extraterritoriality right and the
establishment of a nationality.82 Tanaka Ryûichi in his 2003 paper “The making of
Manchuria and the problem of Koreans in Manchukuo: the conflicts between „five races
harmony‟ and „Japan and Korea as one‟” reveals the contradiction between “wuzugonghe”
(five nations living harmonically under one roof) and the “naisen ittai” principle.83 Lu
Xinyi‟s “A study on the nationality issue of Korean in Manchukuo” sheds light on the
nationality issue of Koreans and suggests that the failure of solving Koreans‟ nationality
issue resulted from Japan‟s attempt to avoid splitting Japanese polity into two.84 These
works share the similarity that they concentrate on the significance of the statuses of the
naichi Japanese and Koreans in Japan‟s creation of Manchukuo, while paying less
attention to the status of local Chinese. While they valued the importance of balancing
the interests of the metropole and its empire, they might have overlooked the fact that the
nature of Manchukuo depended heavily on the wishes of local Chinese.

82

Asano Toyomi, “„Manshûkoku’ ni okeru chigaihôken mondai to kokusekihô (The extraterritoriality and
nationality law issue in Manchukuo)”, Shibusawa Kenkyû 11, (1998).
83
Tanaka Ryûichi, “„Manshûkokumin‟ no sôshutsu to „zaimanchôsenjin‟ mondai: „Gozokukyowa‟ to
„Naisen-ittai‟no sôkoku (The making of Manchurian and the problem of Koreans in Manchukuo: the
conflicts between „five races harmony‟ and „Japan and Korea as one‟ )”, East Asian Modern History 6
(March 2003)
84
Lu (2006)

45

On the other hand, this thesis has no intention to downplay the historical
significance of naichi Japanese and Koreans. On the contrary, it agrees with the opinions
proposed by the above-mentioned three Japanese scholars. Although the naichi Japanese
and Koreans were underrepresented, they played an important role in making Manchukuo
an international state. Rather than being colonizers or privileged foreigners with
extraterritoriality, their status in Manchukuo as people of Manchukuo by acquiring
Manchukuo nationality had political meaning in supporting Manchukuo as an
independent state. Moreover, whether or not they stood for the interests of the metropole,
their participation in the building of Manchukuo had at least demonstrates that
Manchukuo government attempted to build a multi-national state.
Manchukuo‟s failure in enacting a nationality law disqualified it from being
considered an independent state; however, even if a nationality law had been enacted, due
to the inequalities existing in daily life between Japanese and non-Japanese nationals, the
Chinese in particular, it might have only afforded another example of showing how
nationality, a legal term, fails to grant citizens the same treatment.
Regardless of the abolishment of extraterritoriality and despite the fact that the
Kwantung Army and Tokyo were on their way toward creating a nationality law to put all
the people under the same jurisdiction, the reality was that the Japanese remained a
privileged group in Manchukuo. For example, rural settlers‟ land acquisition was
undertaken with protection from the Kwantung Army, and urban settlers in general
enjoyed a better living standard. The reality that Manchukuo was a state without nationals
and was unable to coin a universally-recognized national term had put the Kwantung
Army in an awkward position. Moreover, discrimination between Japanese and non-
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Japanese residents once again belied the fact that Manchukuo was not an egalitarian
society.
After Japan‟s sudden loss of its overseas colonies in the wake of its defeat in
WWII, the term Manchukuo quickly became a dead word. It survives now in academic
and documentary works and in the memories of the people who experienced life in
Manchukuo. However, the collapse of the state and the death of the word do not offer any
answers to the questions triggered by them. In recasting light on the technical difficulties
in the legislation of Manchukuo nationality, the aim of this thesis is not to reevaluate the
efforts made by the Kwantung Army to ennoble Manchukuo to a legitimate state. This
thesis tries to underscore the fact that the equality of formalism cannot stand for real
equality. In a similar vein, reconsidering the hardships in making a new state is not to
romanticize Japan‟s colonization in Manchukuo or to demonstrate that Japan‟s
imperialism was different from that of the West. Rather, examining the complicated or
even incompatible relationship between laws of the metropole and the empire provides a
clear example showing that Japan‟s real outlook on East Asia was not to create PanAsianism and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, but rather to build a Japanese
Empire with subordinate colonies.
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